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Abstract
We introduce the heterogeneities of EIS (elasticities of intertemporal substi-
tution) into the Ramsey version of macrodynamic model with a nite number of
agents. The assumption that the degrees of EIS dier among agents means that our
economy has various growth rate of private consumption. Then, our contributions
are as follows. First, we analytically characterize the steady-state levels of indi-
vidual capital. Second, we analytically examine the role of heterogeneous EIS for
the wealth inequality. Finally, we give numerical examples to see the complicated
dynamic motion and the steady-state characterization of wealth inequality.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between wealth and a consumer's attitude toward risk{as indicated by
the degree of risk aversion{is central to many elds of economics. Earliest studies (e.g.,
Arrow 1970, and Friend and Blume 1975) have focused on examining whether or how
the behavior of risk attitudes varies as wealth varies.1 In recent years, the experimental
studies (e.g., Holt and Laury (2002)), which attempt to measure directly the degrees of
risk aversion of individuals, examine the measured degrees of risk aversion and wealth.
Furthermore, along with the development in the behavioral economics, it has been well-
known that the degrees of risk aversion of individuals dier each other (See Holt and
Laury 2002, Tanaka et al. 2010). Since the degrees of risk aversion shape the elasticities
of intertemporal substitution (EIS), the heterogeneities of risk aversion mean that the
intertemporal consumption-saving decisions among individuals dier each other. Then,
the important issue which naturally arises is to examine the role of heterogeneous EIS
for wealth inequality in the framework of macroeconomic dynamics.
So far, most dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic theory has treated all agents
as identical (the representative-agent paradigm). The simple model yields many predic-
tions, but the assumption that an economy is inhabited by a single type of consumers
highly simplies some general characterization of key elements. The foregoing litera-
ture that has addressed wealth inequality also relies heavily on the assumption that the
preferences of individuals are identical and homothetic: see Chatterjee (1994), Sorger
(2000), Maliar and Maliar (2001), Alvarez-Pelaez and Daz (2005), Garca-Pe~nalosa and
Turnovsky (2006, 2007, 2008) and Atolia et al (2012). The simplicity of preferences yields
the constancy of relative consumption between individuals over time, which implies that
the intertemporal choices in saving-consumption are simply given, so that the model can
be reduced to the representative-agent model. In that regard, the introduction of hetero-
geneous EIS yields the lack of simplicity and tractability. In particular, the appearance
of a continuum of steady state makes the analytical analysis dicult.2
The purpose of this paper is to extend the Ramsey version of dynamic models with
1For instance, one important consequence is that individuals facing high exogenous labor income risk,
which is normally uninsurable, will be more risk averse. See Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993)
and Eekhoudt et al. (1996).
2As for the preferences, assuming that the rate of time preference is endogenous, or that the publicly
provided goods are incorporated into the utility function, it has been known that the dynamic models do
not face a continuum of steady state, and then the analysis of wealth inequality is given by the steady-
state characterization. For instance, see Epstein (1987a), Epstein (1987b) and Caselli and Ventura
(2000).
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a nite number of agents by assuming that they have dierent degrees of EIS (risk
aversion), and examines the role of heterogeneous EIS for wealth inequality. In particular,
assuming that EIS is heterogeneous among agents deviates from the readily predicted
behavior of consumption in the homogeneous EIS economy in the following two respects.
Firstly, when the utility function is identical, the initial jump of private consumption
depends on only the initial level of capital stock, which means that an initially wealthier
household chooses a higher level of initial consumption. On the other hand, under the
heterogeneous EIS, since the initial jump of private consumption is dependent of not
only the initial level of capital stock but also the degrees of EIS, an initial rich does
not necessarily choose a high level of initial consumption when he has the propensity
to make the investment willingly. Secondly, the ratio of relative consumption between
agents changes over time under the heterogeneous EIS, while it is constant over time
under the homogeneous EIS. Because of these dierences, we will see various pattern of
wealth inequality. Then, we analytically give a solution for the following issues. What is
the dierence of wealth inequality under the homogeneous and heterogeneous EIS? What
elements compose of wealth inequality under the heterogeneous EIS, deviated from that
under the homogeneous EIS? How does the dispersion of wealth aect the speeds of
convergence? Turning into numerical simulation, we seek further to explore dynamic
motion and steady-state characterization of wealth inequality, especially, we examine
how wealth inequality is formed by the pattern of dispersed degrees of EIS, how wealth
inequality moves over time, and how much the dispersion of wealth impacts the speeds of
convergence. Finally, we examine whether the heterogeneous EIS can be the key element
of forming the wealth inequality.
Our paper is related to the recent literature in macrodynamic models. Sorger (2002)
and Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2008) comprehensively study the wealth and
income distribution in one-sector growth models with elastic labor supply. For exam-
ple, Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2008) conrm that the introduction of elastic labor
supply yields a drastic change between wealth and income distributions. They make
a substantial extension and obtain the outstanding results, while the assumption that
agents have identical and homothetic preferences simplies the analysis of wealth dis-
tribution. Therefore, the level of wealth distribution monotonically moves along time
although the production side is not complicated.3 In the current paper, the introduction
of heterogeneous EIS yields the complicated motion of wealth inequality.
To examine the role of heterogeneous risk aversion for wealth inequality, Coen-Pirani
3Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2009) examine if the elasticity of substitution in production has
the qualitative eects on the wealth inequality under the homogeneous EIS economy.
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(2004, 2005) construct an endowment economy populated by two types of agents with
dierent degrees of risk aversion. Our motivation is alike to his motivation in the sense
that both papers examine the role of the heterogeneous preferences for the wealth in-
equality. Alternatively, our paper is dierent from Coen-Pirani (2004, 2005) as follows.
First, making use of the preferences in Epstein and Zin (1989), Coen-Pirani (2004, 2005)
assume that the degrees of risk aversion are dierent but EIS is homogeneous, so that the
intertemporal decisions in consumption-saving are simplied, while our papers assume
the heterogeneities of EIS. Second, the evolution in Coen-Pirani (2004, 2005) is char-
acterized by the growth rate of perishable dividend with two-state Markov process in a
discrete time model, while our model uses the Ramsey version of macrodynamic model.
Third, Coen-Pirani (2004, 2005) simply assume two types of agents, while we adopt a
more general setting in the sense that the economy has N types of agents.
Turnovsky (2002) examines the role of EIS for the speeds of convergence. Because
he adopts the representative-agent model, the speeds of convergence are determined by
macroeconomic variables alone, irrespective of the dispersion of wealth. Alternatively,
since we extend Turnovsky (2002) by introducing a nite number of agents with the
dierent degrees of EIS, the dispersion of wealth inuences the speeds of convergence.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our economy and derives the
macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 3 examines the speeds of convergence under the
heterogeneous EIS. Section 4 analytically characterizes the distributions of wealth and
obtains the main ndings of wealth distribution. Section 5 shows numerical examples.
Section 6 concludes, while the technical details in characterizing the steady-state levels
of individual capital are given in Appendix.
2 Model
We describe our model of a closed economy where time is taken in continuous intervals.
The stock of capital is the only net asset held by agents. There are many agents indexed
by i = 1; 2; ::; N , where we assume that the initial holdings of capital stock are dierent
each other. We assume that the population in the whole economy is constant over time.
The representative rm produces a single good according to a constant-returns-to-
scale technology expressed by Y = F (K;L) where the production function satises neo-
classical properties. Here, Y; K and L denote the total output, capital and employment
4Turnovsky (2002) is more general in the point that he examines the role of not only EIS but also
the elasticities of intratemporal substitution.
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of labor, respectively.5 The wage rate, W , and the return to capital, R, are determined
by the marginal products of each production factor:
W (K;L) = FL(K;L); R(K;L) = FK(K;L): (1)
Denoting the levels of capital stock and private consumption, and an amount of labor
by an agent i as Ki, Ci and Li, we assume that she faces a ow budget constraint, such
that
_Ki = (R  )Ki +WLi   Ci i = 1; 2; ::; N; (2)
where  is a constant rate of depreciation and the initial level of capital holding K0i is
exogenously given. Assuming that the commodity market is competitive, summing (2)
among all agents yields the output market in equilibrium:
Y = _K + K + C; (3)
where C =
PN
i=1 Ci denotes the level of aggregate consumption.
The full-employment conditions are given in:
K =
NX
i=1
Ki; L =
NX
i=1
Li: (4)
2.1 Set up
To keep with our focus on the role of heterogeneous EIS for the wealth inequality, we
simplify the consumer's consumption-leisure choice by providing the assumption that each
consumer inelastically supplies an identical labor service such that Li = L(i = 1; 2; :::; N).
As a result, the cross-sectional dierences in income are caused by the dierences in
capital stock alone, meaning that we can exclude a complicated dierence of dynamic
behavior between wealth inequality and income one.6
The evaluation of life-time utility depends on the consumption proles alone as follows:
U i =
Z +1
0
e t
C1 ii
1  i dt;  > 0; i > 0; i = 1; 2; ::; N: (5)
We assume that the rate of time preference among agents, , is identical among agents,
and that the preference parameter, i (i = 1; :::; N), is not necessarily identical each
other.
5We omit time variable t as long as it does not invite confusion.
6Turnovsky and Garca-Pe~nalosa (2008) show that the introduction of endogenous labor supply itself
may lead to opposite movement between income and wealth inequalities in response to a structural
change.
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Each agent maximizes U i subject to (2), a constant level of labor supply and the initial
holding of capital, K0i : Letting the implicit price of capital Ki be qi; the optimization
conditions include
C ii = qi; i = 1; 2; ::; N; (6a)
_qi
qi
= +   R; i = 1; 2; ::; N; (6b)
together with the transversality condition, limt!1 e tqiKi = 0:
Since the right-hand side of (6b) is the same among agents, it holds that _q1=q1 =
_q2=q2 = ::: = _qN=qN for all t  0. Dening 
ij  qi=qj (i; j = 1; 2; :::; N) where 
ij is a
positive constant parameter, from (6a) we can show that

ij =
C ii
C
 j
j
; i; j = 1; 2:::; N; i 6= j: (7)
Because 
ij (i; j = 1; 2; :::; N) (i 6= j) are undetermined, our model needs to specify
trajectory starting from a specic set of initial conditions unlike the representative-agent
model.
From (1), (6a) and (6b), we derive the well-known Euler equation:
_Ci
Ci
=
R     
i
; i = 1; 2; :::; N: (8)
From (8), we pay attention to the following two points. First, agents have dierent
degrees of EIS 1=i (i = 1; :::; N). Therefore, the individual consumption growth (8)
cannot be aggregated. Second, noting that i > 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; N), which is the stan-
dard assumption that the marginal utility of private consumption decreases as the level
of private consumption increases, we show that all agents have an identical sign of con-
sumption growth. In other words, when K0 < K so that R >  +  over time, _Ci=Ci
(i = 1; 2; :::; N) has a positive sign over time, meaning that the capital stocks held by
each agent move in the same direction along time. That is, if K0 < K, it holds that
K0i < K

i for all agents. When K
0 > K, the reversal relationship can be applied.
Using (1) and (2) under the inelastic labor supply, we obtain:
_Ki = (R(K)  )Ki +W (K)L  Ci; i = 1; 2; :::; N; (9a)
and the dynamic equation of aggregate capital is given by:
_K = (R(K)  )K +W (K)  C; (9b)
where the aggregate labor supply is xed by 1 = N L.
Finally, in a tractable form, the unknown constant parameter 
ij is expressed by:

ij =
iC
 i 1
i (K
0
i  Ki )
jC
 j 1
j (K
0
j  Kj )
: (10)
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We give the detail derivation in Appendix A where the utility function is given by a
general form.
2.2 The steady state
From (1) and (8), the steady-state level of aggregate capital, K, is determined by the
modied Golden-Rule condition:
R(K) = + ; (11a)
where from (4) we can show that
K =
NX
i=1
Ki : (11b)
Furthermore, summing up _Ki = 0 among all agents, and using (11a) and (11b) where
N L = 1, we can determine the steady-state level of aggregate consumption:
C = K +W (K): (11c)
As a result, the steady-state levels of aggregate capital as well as aggregate consumption
are uniquely determined as in the representative-agent model.
Next, we investigate the determination of the steady-state levels of individual capital
and consumption. From (7) and (10), we can use the following equations in the steady
state:
Ci
Cj
=
i(K
0
i  Ki )
j(K0j  Kj )
; i; j = 1; 2; :::; N; i 6= j: (12a)
Without the loss of generality, we assume that the agent 1 is a base agent:
Ci
C1
=
i(K
0
i  Ki )
1(K01  K1 )
; i = 2; :::; N: (12b)
Besides, from _Ki = 0 the steady-state levels of private consumption are given by:
Ci = K

i +W (K
)L; i = 1; 2; :::; N: (13)
Under the uniquely determined level of aggregate capital stock at the steady state,
using 2N equations composed of (11b), (12b) and (13) yields the following.
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium is uniquely determined given K0i and i
(i = 1; 2; :::; N).
Proof. Substituting (13) into (12b), we can obtain the following:
Ki = K

i (K

1 );
@Ki
@K1
=
(RK01 +W
 L)(W  L+RKi )(K
0
i  Ki )
(RK0i +W  L)(W  L+RK

1 )(K
0
1  K1 )
(> 0): (14)
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Since K01 < (>)K

1 and K
0
i < (>)K

i under K
0 < (>)K, we can see that @Ki =@K

1
always has a positive sign.
Next, substituting (14) into (11b), we can obtain the following:
K() = K1 +
NX
i=2
Ki (K

1 ): (15)
Note that the steady-state level of aggregate capital is determined by (11a) so that the
value of left-side hand is xed.
Because the right-hand side monotonically increases with K1 , there is a level of K

1
that satises the equation (15). Finally, from (14) the steady-state levels of individual
capital stock held by all agents are determined.
At the steady state, we analytically derive the relationship of individual capital stocks
between agents i and j as follows:7
Proposition 2 Assume that the initial levels of capital stock held by agents i and j are
the same. When K0 < K, the heterogeneity i > j leads to Kj > K

i > K
0
i = K
0
j and
Cj > C

i . Alternatively, assuming that K
0 > K, i > j leads to Kj < K

i < K
0
i = K
0
j
and Cj < C

i .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows that a higher degree of EIS (i.e., a lower value of i or j) leads
to a greater level of individual capital stock in the long run under a growing economy
such that K > K0. The intuitive explanation is as follows. Suppose that K0 < K
so that R >  +  over time, and furthermore that i > j . Since 1=j > 1=i, the
positive growth rate of consumption for the agent j is greater along time. As a result,
since the investment by the agent j is higher than that by the agent i, in the steady-state
equilibrium it holds that the agent j is richer in wealth, that is, Ki < K

j . If K
0 > K,
the above relationship is reversed.
3 Convergence speed and the dispersion of wealth
To focus on the heterogeneities of EIS, it is helpful to clarify the dierence of convergence
speeds between the heterogeneous and the homogeneous EIS. When EIS is homogeneous
(i.e.,  = i for all i in (5)), we can show the Euler equation _C=C = (R(K)     ) =;
7In addition, under the assumption that i = j , we can see that the initially more wealthy agent
has a greater amount of capital stock in the steady state relative to the initially less wealthy one. That
is, when K0i > (<)K
0
j under i = j (i; j = 1; 2; :::; N and i 6= j), it holds that Ki > (<)Kj so that
Ci > (<)C

j .
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instead, the capital accumulation equation is the same with (9b). Then, the speed of
convergence Rep under the homogeneous EIS is given by:
2Rep =  
s
2   4RK(K
)C

(< 0): (16a)
Because of the homogeneity of EIS, the levels of private consumption can be summed up,
thereby being able to conrm that the speed of convergence in this case is identical to that
in the representative-agent model. That is, since the speed of convergence is determined
by the aggregate variable alone, the dispersion of wealth does not have any impacts on
the speeds of convergence. Hence, we obtain the well-known fact that  convergence
does not inuence  convergence (See Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
Next, the convergence speed  under the heterogeneous EIS is given by:8
2 =  
vuut2   4RK(K) NX
i=1

Ci
i

(< 0): (16b)
Since the steady-state levels of private consumption cannot be summed up, it can be
seen that the dispersion of wealth at the steady-state equilibrium aects the speed of
convergence. More concretely, making use of the individual capital stock relative to the
average capital, ki  KiK=N , and dening the dierence between the level of individual
capital and the average level as i;k  ki   1, the sum of the reciprocal of absolute risk
aversion can be modied by:
NX
i=1

Ci
i

= C
NX
i=1

1
i

1
N| {z }
(#1)
+
KR(K)
N
NX
i=1
i;k
i| {z }
(#2)
(> 0): (17)
Note that i;k has a positive sign (a negative sign) if the level of wealth held by the agent
i is more (less) than the mean level.
The
PN
i=1

1
i

1
N in (#1) represents the mean level of EIS. The (#2) emerges from
the heterogeneity of EIS. Noting that i;k is the relative position of capital held by the
agent i compared with the average level of capital, the second term (#2) may be called
as the wealth distribution eect. Considering that (#2) has positive or negative sign,
the wealth distribution eect makes the speeds of convergence faster or slower. For
instance, if the relatively more wealth people (i;k > 0) in the long run have greater
degrees of EIS on average, the wealth distribution eect positively impacts on the speed
of convergence. That is, since the riches like to save for the investment in the future,
which implies that the larger ratio of entire wealth is invested, the growth of the whole
8See Appendix C for the derivation.
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economy is more accelerated. As a result, the economy converges towards the steady-
state equilibrium at a faster rate. In that case, the larger the wealth inequality, the faster
the speed of convergence. Alternatively, if the opposite case is applied, the expansion
of wealth inequality negatively inuences the speed of convergence. The results can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 In the long-run unequal economy that the relative-wealth rich agents have
greater (smaller) degrees of EIS on average, the expansion of wealth inequality makes the
speed of convergence increased (decreased).
4 Wealth distribution
4.1 The dynamics of the relative wealth
Using (9a) and (9b) as in Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2008, 2009), the dynamic
motion of relative wealth is:
_ki =
W (K)(1  ki)
K
+
C(ki   ci)
K
; i = 1; 2; :::; N; (18)
where ci =
Ci
C=N . Importantly, this dynamic equation clearly gives the dierence between
the homogeneous and heterogeneous EIS. Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2008,
2009) assume that the utility function is identical and homothetic among the agents. In
their setting individual consumption that moves in the same direction changes at the
same rate, so that the level of relative consumption of each agent, ci, stays constant over
time. However, considering that the degrees of EIS dier among agents, the levels of
relative consumption, ci, change during the transitional process.
To clarify the role of heterogeneous EIS, we dene the following:
i  ci=iPN
i=1 (ci=i) (1=N)
(> 0): (19)
Noting that i =  for all i, it holds i = ci. In other words, under the homogeneous EIS,
the ratio of relative weighted EIS, i, is identical to the ratio of relative consumption, ci.
Moreover, since the ratio of relative consumption, ci, does not move during the transition,
i does not change during the transition as well. That is, it holds that i = ci(= c

i )
along time. Turning to the heterogeneous EIS, the equations do not hold because these
values respectively change through time.
Linearizing (18) at the steady state, we can show the following:9
ki = k

i +
i;kZ

i (K
  K0)
   e
t; (20)
9See Appendix D.
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Each Zi in the homogeneous and heterogeneous EIS is given by:
Heterogeneous EIS: Zi =
 WK(K) + (  +RK(K)K +WK(K))

1  

i;
i;k

K
:
(21a)
Homogeneous EIS: Zi = Z
 =
W (K)

1  WK(K)KW (K) + RK(K
)K
   

CK
: (21b)
where i; = i   1: Notice that when EIS is homogeneous, all agents face an identical
value of Z given in (21b), while if agents have dierent degrees of EIS, they have each
value of Zi in (21a).
Moreover, to simplify our discussion, in what follows we assume that
1  WK(K
)K
W (K)
  RK(K
)K

; (22)
so that Z always has a positive sign in (21b). For instance, when the production function
is Cobb-Douglas type R(K) = AK 1 and W (K) = (1   )AK and the rate of
depreciation is zero, then the condition (22) is satised.10
4.2 Catching-up
Using (20), we can show the dierence of wealth held by two agents i and j, dened by
kij = ki   kj :
Heterogeneous EIS: kij = k
0
ij  
(K  K0)(i;kZi   j;kZj )(1  et)
   : (23a)
If EIS is homogeneous, the equation (23a) can be reduced to:
Homogeneous EIS: kij = k
0
ij  
(K  K0)Zkij(1  et)
   : (23b)
Then, in a growing economyK > K0, substituting kij = 0 into (23b) yields sign(k0ij) =sign(k

ij),
meaning that k0i > k
0
j and k

i > k

j . Considering that the relative consumption is constant
during the transition, we can conclude that the catching-up does not arise over time.
Under the heterogeneous EIS, since the relative consumption changes during the tran-
sition, the catching-up may arise such that kij = ki   kj = 0. Now, suppose that an
agent i is initially relative-wealth richer than an agent j. That is, k0ij = k
0
i   k0j > 0.
Dening by T the time that the initially less wealthy household j will catch up with the
initially more wealthy household i, which means that kij = ki   kj = 0, we lead to the
following:
T =
1

log
"
1  k
0
ij(  )
(K  K0)(i;kZi   j;kZj )
#
: (24)
10Making use of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the production function,
Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2009) mention the possibility of changing the sign of Z in (21b).
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If T has a positive sign, it holds kij = 0 at time T . Then, the results can be summarized
as follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose that K > K0 and k0ij > 0 under (22). Then, the catching-up
does not arise in the case of homogeneous EIS. Alternatively, in the case of the hetero-
geneous EIS, the initially wealth poor j will catch up in wealth if the following condition
is satised:
0 <
k0ij(  )
(K  K0)(i;kZi   j;kZj )
< 1: (25)
Otherwise, the catching-up does not arise in the heterogeneous EIS.
Proof. Making use of (24), we can derive (25).
Since the intuitive explanation in the case of homogeneous EIS is given in the above,
we now focus on the case in which the degrees of EIS between agents i and j dier where
K > K0. The necessary condition of arising the catching-up, i;kZ

i > 

j;kZ

j , is given
by:
(0 >)kij >

1 +
WK(K
)
  +RK(K)K

(i   j ): (26)
where 1 + WK(K
)
 +RK(K)K > 0 under the condition (22). When an initially less wealth
agent j catches up with the agent i in wealth, the sign of kij is negative. Therefore, at
least it is needed to hold that j > 

i to see the catching-up, which implies that since the
value of EIS by the agent j is greater than that by the agent i, the initially less wealthy
agent j likes to save more than the agent i.
4.3 The dynamics of the wealth inequality
We now turn to the dynamics of wealth inequality in the entire economy. The relative
wealth (20) can be rstly rewritten as:
i;k = 

i;k

1 +
Zi (K
  K0)et
  

: (27)
Before we derive the wealth inequality, it is useful to dierentiate (27) with respect
to time:
@i;k
@t
=
i;kZ

i (K
  K0)et
   : (28)
Using (28), we can summarize the dynamic motion of relative wealth as follows.
Proposition 5 We assume that the economy is growing over time (K > K0) under
(22). (i) In the case of homogeneous EIS, it holds that sign

@i;k
@t

=  sign(i;k). (ii)
In the case of heterogeneous EIS, it holds that sign

@i;k
@t

=  sign(Zi i;k).
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Proposition 5 is helpful to understand the dynamic behavior of wealth inequality. At
rst, from Proposition 5(i), we can guess that the wealth inequality decreases over time
under the homogeneous EIS. For instance, let us consider that an agent i is relatively
wealth-rich in the long run (i.e., i;k > 0). From Proposition 5(i), the level of wealth held
by the agent i relative to the mean level decreases over time @i;k=@t < 0, which means
that the initially unequal distribution shrinks over time. From Proposition 4, since the
catching-up does not arise, the dierence of wealth between the mean and the agent i
persists in the long run, i;k > 0. As a result, we conclude that 
0
i;k > 

i;k > 0. Similarly,
if i;k < 0, it holds that @i;k=@t > 0, thereby showing that the unequal distribution
shrinks over time 0i;k < 

i;k < 0. Considering that the levels of wealth held by all agents
are approaching to the mean level over time, we can see that the wealth distribution in
the homogeneous EIS monotonically shrinks during the transitional process.
This movement is intuitively reasonable. Consider that an agent i at the initial period
is relatively wealth-rich, that is, 0i;k > 0. Due to the dierence of the initial capital stock,
the initial jump of private consumption by the agent i is larger than that by the average
agent, which means that at next period, 0i;k > i;k > 0. After that, since the relative
consumption is constant along time, the relationship that 0i;k > i;k > 0 continues until
the steady-state equilibrium.
These results mean that if we dene the index of wealth inequality at time t as follows:
Skk 
NX
i=1
2i;k(> 0); (29)
then the dierence of the initial jump of private consumption leads to less unequal econ-
omy in the long run. In other words, we nd that S0kk > S

kk > 0 and @Skk=@t < 0:
In the case of heterogeneous EIS, the movement of wealth distribution is more com-
plicated. This is because there are two dierent movements compared with the case
in which EIS is homogeneous. First, unlike the homogeneous EIS, the divergence may
expand in the heterogeneous EIS. To conrm this movement, suppose that an agent i
is initially relative-wealth rich, 0i;k > 0. It holds that @i;k=@t > 0 when the following
inequality is satised:
1  

i;
i;k
<
WK(K
)
  +RK(K)K +WK(K) : (30)
where i;k has a positive sign. If 

i; > 

i;k, then the inequality (30) is satised where the
right-hand side of (30) has a positive sign. That is, when the initially relative-wealth rich
i has a strong degree of EIS such that i; > 

i;k, the dierence between his wealth level
and the average one expands over time. Likewise, it is possible that the initially relative-
wealth poor i further falls down the relative position in wealth, such that 0 > 0i;k > 

i;k.
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Second, we consider the case in which the wealth dispersion shrinks. This case can
be seen in the case of homogeneous EIS as well. However, noting that the catching-up
can arise in the heterogeneous EIS, the heterogeneity of EIS gives an interesting case.
Suppose that an agent i is relative-wealth rich at the beginning of economy. In the
homogeneous EIS, the level of relative wealth decreases over time; however, the reversal
between the agent i's wealth level and the average one does not arise. That is, it always
holds that 0i;k > 

i;k > 0. When EIS is heterogeneous, it is possible that the agent i
holds wealth less than the average level in the long run, 0i;k > 0 > 

i;k. If the following
inequality is satised, we can see that @k;t=@t < 0, such that 
0
i;k > 0 > 

i;k:
1  

i;
i;k
<
WK(K
)
  +RK(K)K +WK(K) : (31)
where i;k has a negative sign. The condition (31) implies that when the initially relative-
wealth rich i holds a low degree of EIS, he does not like to save during the transition,
and his wealth may relatively fall over time. Concretely, at time T in (24), the reversal
between the agent i's wealth level and the average one arises, and since then, the initially
relative-wealth rich agent i holds less wealth compared with the average level until the
steady state.11
Based on the above, we can presume the pattern of movement of wealth distribution
to some extent. However, it is not evident which elements compose the wealth inequality
in the entire economy. We now derive the wealth inequality Skk. For the purpose of
comparison, we can rstly consider the case in which EIS is homogeneous. By raising
both sides of the equation (27) to the second power, and summing up it among the agents,
we can obtain the following:
Homogeneous EIS: Skk =

1 + Z
(K K0)et
 
2

1 + Z
(K K0)
 
2 S0kk; (32)
where S0kk is the initial level of wealth inequality. Substituting t = 1 into (32), and
assuming a growing economy K0 < K, as predicted, we nd that the steady state level
of wealth inequality is smaller than its initial level S0kk > S

kk > 0, and that the level of
wealth inequality decreases over time @Skk@t < 0.
11Instead of 0i;k > 0 > 

i;k, we can see @k;t=@t < 0, such that 
0
i;k > 

i;k > 0., if the following
inequality is satised:
1 
i;
i;k
>
WK(K
)
  +RK(K)K +WK(K)
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Next, we can derive the wealth inequality in the case of the heterogeneous EIS:12
Skk =  1S
0
kk| {z }
(#3)
 

K  K0
K
2  
 1   e2t

S| {z }
(#4)
+ 2S

k| {z }
(#5)
; (33)
where Sk =
PN
i=1 

i;k

i; and S

 =
PN
i=1(

i;)
2(> 0). We notice that S always has a
positive sign, while Sk has either a positive sign or a negative one. The  1 and  2 are:
(1 >) 1 =
0@1 + (K K0)etK

1 + RK(K
)K
 

1 + K
 K0
K

1 + RK(K
)K
 

1A2 (> 0); (34a)
 2 =
2(K  K0)

1 + RKK
+WK
 

K

1 + K
 K0
K

1 + RKK

 
2

(
(1  et)
"
1 +

1 +
RKK

  
2
K  K0
K
2
et
#
+ (1  e2t)

K  K0
K

1 +
RKK

  
)
(> 0):
(34b)
where we assume that K > K0. We must note that  1 and  2 move over time, not
xed.
Then, we can reach the following conclusions about the long-run wealth distribution.
Proposition 6 We assume that the economy is growing over time (K > K0) where we
assume (22). In the heterogeneous EIS, the long-run wealth inequality is more than the
initial level of inequality if the following inequality is satised:
Sk >
1   1
 2
S0kk +

K  K0
K

 1
 2
S; (35)
while if the opposite inequality is satised, we can see that the long-run wealth inequality
is less than the initial level. The  1 and  

2 represent the steady-state values of (34a) and
(34b):
(1 >) 1 =
1
1 + K
 K0
K

1 + RK(K
)K
 
2 (> 0);  2 = 2(K  K0)

1 + RK(K
)K+WK(K)
 

K

1 + K
 K0
K

1 + RK(K
)K
 
 (> 0):
Proof. Substituting t =1 into (33), we can see the following:
Skk   S0kk = ( 1   1)S0kk  

K  K0
K
2
 1S

 +  

2S

k; (36)
thereby being able to obtain (35).
The wealth inequality in (33) consists of three factors. First, the wealth inequality
at time t is aected by the initially distributed wealth holding S0kk in (#3). Noting
12See Appendix E.
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that  1 has a positive sign, the larger the dispersion of wealth distribution at the initial
period, the larger the level of wealth inequality over time as seen in (33). However, since
0 <  1 < 1, from (35) it tends to hold that S
0 > Skk as the initial level of wealth
inequality, S0, is larger.
If S = S

k = 0, (33) can be reduced to (32), which means that the heterogeneity
of EIS newly yields the eects given in (#4) and (#5). The (#4) shows the long-run
dispersion of heterogeneous EIS. In particular, the coecient  1 e2t has a positive sign
as follows:
 1   e2t =
(1  e2t) + 2(K K0)K

1 + RK(K
)K
 

et
 
1  et
1 + K
 K0
K

1 + RK(K
)K
 
2 (> 0); (37)
where we assume that K > K0. That is, in a growing economy the long-run disper-
sion in EIS has the negative impacts on the wealth inequality regardless of any spatial
arrangement of dispersed degrees of EIS.
Our interests are turned to (#5) in (33). Because  2 has a positive sign, the larger
value of Sk produces a larger level of long-run wealth inequality S

kk as seen in Proposi-
tion 6. Intuitively, if a lot of long-run riches have large degrees of EIS, which means that
the positive value of Sk is large, the long-run wealth inequality increases.
Finally, we mention the income inequality. Owing to the xed labor supply, the
dynamic movement of income inequality is characterized by only the wealth inequality:13
That is, because Yi = (R(Ki)  )Ki +W (K)L, we can rewrite it as
yi =

R(K)K
Y
  K
Y

ki + (1  )
L
1=N
; (38)
where yi = Yi=(Y=N). Therefore the income inequality is given by:
Syy =

  K
Y
2
Skk +

K
Y
2
; (39)
concluding that the larger the level of wealth inequality Skk, the larger the level of income
inequality.
5 Numerical examples
To obtain further insights into the dynamic behavior and the steady-state characterization
of wealth inequality, we turn to simulate our economy. To do so, we adopt the Cobb-
Douglas type of production function Y = AK where 0 <  < 1 and A > 0, so that the
13Garca-Pe~nalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2008) construct a more general set-up in the sense that the
labor supply is endogenous.
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inequality (22) is satised. That is, in the homogeneous EIS economy such that i = 
for all agents i, the level of wealth inequality monotonically decreases over time.
The parameter values we use are mostly conventional:
Production parameters:  = 0:35; A = 0:5;  = 0:02
Taste parameters:  = 0:04;  = 2:5
The number of agents: N = 201
Aggregate capital stock: K = 5:1905; K0 = 0:75K
The rate of time preference of 4% and the parameter of risk aversion, 2.5 are generally
used in this eld. When we set at  = 0:02, the interest rate at the steady state, R(K)
is 6% in the benchmark economy. The choice of  = 0:35 implies that 35% of output
accrues to private capital and the rest of inelastic labor supply. The level of aggregate
capital stock at the initial economy is 75% level of aggregate capital stock at the steady
state, that is, we assume a growing economy that K > K0(= 0:75K). We furthermore
assume that the number of agents is 201, which means that one person has the average
level of capital stock, one-hundred persons are relatively wealth-rich and the rest one-
hundred persons are relatively wealth-poor.
Since the agents in this model have the heterogeneities of EIS and the dierent levels
of initial capital, a complicated setting of two heterogeneities leads to the confusion
so that it is hard to obtain the intuitive explanation on the dynamic motion of wealth
inequality. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that the initial levels of individual capital
stock are uniformly distributed, and furthermore that the initial wealth inequality, S0kk
has an identical value throughout our simulation. In detail, the agents are placed in order
based on the initial holding of capital as follows:
K01
K0101
= 0:9;
K02
K0101
= 0:901; :::;
K0100
K0101
= 0:999;
K0102
K0101
= 1:001;
K0103
K0101
= 1:002; :::;
K0201
K0101
= 1:1;
which means that when the 101-th agent is set as the average agent in the sense that he
holds the initial level of capital stock dened by K0101 =
K0
201 and 
0
101 = 0, the initial
levels of capital holdings held by each agent are uniformly given. In this case, we give
S0kk = 0:6767 in all examples where rst one-hundred agents are initially poorer in wealth
relative to the 101-th agent and the rest one-hundred agents are initially richer.
5.1 EIS, the speed of convergence and wealth distribution
Homogeneous EIS
Table 1 reports the homogeneous EIS economy in which all agents have an identical
value of . In particular, the value  = 2:5 is widely used in this eld. The long-run
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wealth inequality, Skk, takes 0.6143, showing that the long-run wealth inequality is lower
than the initial level of inequality S0kk(= 0:6767) > S

kk as analytically seen in the previous
section, and that the wealth inequality decrease by around 10 % in this homogeneous EIS
economy. Since the speed of convergence is 0.0325, it takes around 40 years to complete
25 percent of transitional process when the initial level of aggregate capital is 75 percent
of steady-state level of aggregate capital, K0 = 0:75K.
Heterogeneous EIS and wealth inequality
In order to investigate the role of heterogeneous EIS for the wealth inequality, we vary
 over a large range. In the baseline set-up, to understand the eects of heterogeneous
EIS on the wealth inequality more easily, we suppose that the values of EIS are divided
into poor and rich according to the initial levels of capital holdings. In other words, we
assume that the initially less wealthy agents (1st{100-th agents) and the 101-th average
agent have poor, and the rest agents (102-th{201-th agents) have rich. The separation
of risk aversion by wealth is supported in the empirical papers. For instance, Friend and
Blume (1975), which is an inuential study in this eld, examine the relationship between
risk aversion and wealth endowment, showing that individuals invest a larger proportion
of their wealth in risky assets as wealth increases. That is, individuals are risk lovers
as own wealth increases. Recently, Guiso and Paiella (2008) nd that the consumer's
endowment negatively aects the degree of his risk aversion, which is consistent with the
nding in Friend and Blume (1975).14
When the values of poor and rich respectively change, Table 2 presents four cases.
Case 1 assumes that the initially relative-wealth rich (poor) has a larger (smaller) degree
of EIS. In the rest three cases, we assume that the initially relative-wealth rich (poor)
has a smaller (larger) degree of EIS. Figure 1{4 show the dynamic behavior of wealth
inequality in (33), Skk, and the elements (#3), (#4) and (#5) in (33), and the steady-
state dispersion of wealth. Concretely, each gure (a) gives the dynamic motion of wealth
inequality and the below (b) indicates those of (#3), (#4) and (#5) where a solid curve
shows the dynamic motion of (#3), a ne curve (#4) and a thick curve (#5). The gures
(c) give the long-run dispersion of wealth.
First, as for the case in which the initially relative-wealth rich has a greater degree of
EIS, moving horizontally along the line of Case 1 in Table 2, we can see that Skk = 2:2057,
nding that the degree of wealth inequality in the steady state is larger than three times
of initial level. Noting that the speed of convergence is 0.0394, such a more unequal
14Considering that wealthier people can make a larger ratio of invest in education, the existing studies
make use of the investment in education as a substitute variable for the investment in the risky asset.
For instance, see Outreville (2013) with respect to a survey of literature in this eld.
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economy approaches to the steady-state equilibrium at a faster speed compared with
the benchmark homogeneous-EIS economy in Table 1. Based on K0 = 0:75K, it takes
about 35 years to complete 25 percent of transitional process. In addition, the correlation
Sk has a positive sign, which means that the agents with the greater degrees of EIS are
relatively wealth-richer in the long run. That is, Case 1 expresses the economy in which
the initially relative-wealth riches keep the relatively superior position in wealth during
the transition. The dispersion of EIS in the steady state, S, is around 15. As seen later
in Table 2, the larger the dierence of EIS, the larger the positive value of S. Looking
at the last row in Table 2, the wealth distribution eect, given by (#2) in (17), is 0.0028,
which accounts for about 7 percent in the speed of convergence.
Figure 1(a) shows that the level of wealth inequality concavely increases over time.
Concretely, Figure 1(a) gives around Skk = 1:35 at Time= 20, seeing that the level of
wealth inequality increases by a double of initial level of wealth inequality around 6 years,
and after that, it reaches a triple level over the rest 29 years. As for each element, the
impact of initial wealth inequality, given in (#3), is positive but merely decreases over
time. The (#4) together with the dispersion in EIS has negative impact and decreases
over time. The impact of (#5) with the correlation Sk is positive and increases across
time. As for (#4) and (#5), notice that there is no impacts at the initial period because
 01 = 1 in (34a) and  
0
2 = 0 in (34b). Turning into Figure 1(c), we can see that the
distribution of wealth is separated in two parts. That is, since the initially more wealth
people who belong to the upper area of uniform distribution at the initial period save
more wealth than the initial poor during the transitional process, the upper area of
uniform distribution at the initial period parts from the lower area.
Next, let us consider the cases in which the initially relative-wealth rich has a lower
degree of EIS. Moving across the horizontal line of Case 2 in Table 2, we rstly nd that
the level of wealth inequality decreases in the long run by around 50 percent, and that the
level of wealth inequality monotonically decreases in Figure 2(a). Comparing this nding
with the homogeneous EIS economy in Table 1, the long-run level of wealth inequality
in Case 2 is lower than the homogeneous-EIS economy, showing that the levels of capital
held by the initial poor people are closer to that held by the initial riches in the long run;
alternatively, we conrmed that about thirty initial poor do not catch up with any initial
riches. The reason can be predicted considering that the dierence of EIS between the
rich and poor group is not large enough. Moreover, this prediction is supported in Figure
2(b), showing that (#4) and (#5) in (33), related to the heterogeneities of EIS, move at
on x-axis = 0, and therefore, they have the insignicant impacts on the wealth inequality
over time. One further point we see is that the correlation Sk has a negative sign in Case
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2, meaning that the agents with the greater degrees of EIS are not relatively wealth-rich
in the steady state. In other words, although the initially less wealth people have the
propensity to save more than the initial riches, they remain relatively wealth-poor in the
long run on average. Finally, from Figure 2(c) it seems that the dispersion of wealth in
the steady state is similar with the normal distribution, which is composed as follows.
Noting that a lot of of initial poor people cannot catch up with a lot of initial riches,
the lower (upper) area composes the initial poor (rich) people. In the middle of wealth
distribution, there is a mixture of initial riches and poor.
In Case 3, we treat the case that the dierence of EIS between the initial poor and rich
is large, poor = 1:5 and rich = 2:5, showing that beyond our prediction, the steady-state
level of wealth inequality is larger than that in the case 2. Then, we can predict that a
lot of initially relative-wealth poor catch up with the initial riches, and furthermore, the
poor holds a lot of wealth in the long run, which can be supported by the positive sign
of Sk. We can see from Figure 3(a) that until Time= 30 the level of wealth inequality
decreases and reaches a bottom level of around Skk = 0:36, and after then, the level
of wealth inequality mildly increases until the steady state. Furthermore, unlike Figure
2(b), the large dierence of EIS derives the eects of (#4) and (#5) in (33) on wealth
inequality along time in Figure 3(b). Figure 3(c) give the distribution of wealth that the
rich group in the long run consists of a lot of initial poor, and the poor group consists of
the initially relative-wealth riches.
Turning to Case 4, we suppose that the dierence of EIS is further large, poor = 1:2
and rich = 2:5. Interestingly, we can nd that the steady-state level of wealth inequality
increases by about fteen percent Skk(= 0:7757) > S
0
kk. Then, Figure 4(a) gives the U-
shaped wealth inequality. In detail, the level of wealth inequality sharply decreases until
around Time= 17, and thereafter, the level of wealth inequality dramatically increases
and is larger than the initial level in the long run. Comparing Figure 3(b) with Figure
4(b), we can see that the dynamic movement of eect (#3) in Figure 4(b) is similar
with that in Figure 3(b); however, the impacts of (#4) and (#5) are larger in Case 4
where we have to notice that the scale of vertical axis in Figure 4(b) is the same with
the double of that in Figure 3(b). For example, Figure 4(b) shows that the positive
impact of the correlation in (#5) is larger than that of (#3) after about Time= 17,
and nally, it is larger than about two times of (#3), thereby being able to see that
the correlation impact in (#5) derives a dramatic increase in wealth inequality after
Time=17. Alternatively, Figure 3(b) does not give such a large eect. Next, looking at
Figure 4(c), we can conrm that the distribution of wealth is separated by two parts like
Figure 1(c). However, unlike Figure 1(c), the persons who belong to the rich (poor) group
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in the steady state are initially relative-wealth poor (rich). As for the wealth distribution
eect on the speeds of convergence, we can see the larger impact in Case 4 than in Case
3.
Finally, Table 3 gives the catching-up time T in (24), such as ij = 0. In particular,
we deal with two agents i = 91 and i = 101 where the 101-th agent holds the average
level of capital stock at the initial period K0101 = K
0=201 and the initial level of capital
stock held by the 91-th agent is K091 = 0:99K
0
101. In Case 3 and 4, these two persons
overtake all people who belong to the rich group in the initial period. Table 3 reveals
the following three points. First, looking at the horizontal lines, we can see that the
larger the initial level of capital stock held by initially relative-wealth riches, the larger
the catching-up time T . For instance, the time T that 101;121 = 0 is larger than the
double of time T that 101;111 = 0 where K
0
111 = 1:01K
0
101 and K
0
121 = 1:02K
0
101. We
furthermore nd that the catching-up time T increases in a convex way as the initial
levels of capital stock held by the initial riches become large. Second, as predicted easily,
the 101-th agent can catch up with each initially relative-wealth rich more rapidly than
the 91-th agent because the initial level of capital stock held by the 101-th agent is larger
than that held by 91-th agent. Third, comparing Case 3 with Case 4, the greater degree
of EIS by the initially relative-wealth poor makes the catching-up time shorter.
5.2 Pareto distribution and multiple types of EIS
Since Pareto (1897), the study of income distribution has a long history. Recently, it
has been well-known that Pareto (power) law is only applicable to the upper tail of
income distribution, while as the income approaches lower ranges, the distribution of
income gradually deviates from Pareto law as rstly claried in Gibrat (1931). For
instance, according to Montroll and Shelesinger (1983) and Souma (2001), the log normal
distribution t the lower tail of observed distribution of US for 1935{1936 and Japan
annual income over the 44 years 1955{1998; and alternatively, Clementi and Gallegati
(2005) observe that the lower tail follows a two-parameter lognormal distribution in
Itary for 1977{2002.15 Looking at each Figure 1{4 (c) again, we can conclude that
the distribution of wealth in the long run does not correspond to the wealth inequality
observed in realistic economies.
The purpose of this subsection is to examine whether the heterogeneities of EIS can
15Kalecki (1945) argues that the log-normal distribution is not stationary, because its width increases
over time. Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2001) nd that the middle portion of the income distribution
has an exponential form for the UK during the period 1994{1999 and for the US in 1998. See other
inuential papers in this feield: Champernowne (1953), Mandelbrot (1960), and Reed (2003).
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be the key element of forming realistic wealth (income) inequality when the aggregated
wealth is uniformly distributed at the initial economy.16 In addition to achieve this
purpose, the important points we have to care about are the following three points.
[ 1 ] Risk lovers (the agents with higher degree of EIS) are relatively wealth-riches in the
long run.
[ 2 ] The dynamic behavior of wealth held by the median agent is inverse-U shaped along
time.
[ 3 ] The level of wealth held by the median agent is lower than its average level in the
long run.
The point [1] follows the nding in Friend and Blume (1975) and Guiso and Paiella
(2008) that a greater proportion of wealth is held in the form of investment as the level
of wealth is increased. As for [2] and [3], Wol (1998) conrms the dynamic motion of
wealth held by the median consumer in U.S. economy. Concretely, making use of the
survey of consumer nances conducted by the Federal Reserve Board in U.S., he sees
an inverse U-shaped motion of median wealth for a U.S. household, that is, the median
wealth increased by 7 percent between 1983 and 1989, however it fell by 17 percent from
1989 to 1995. In particular, it is observed that the median level of wealth is lower than
the average level.
We now assume the following EIS.
i = 1:8 (i = 1  3); 1:87 (i = 4  10); 2 (i = 11  30); 2:5 (i = 31  100);
i = 3 (i = 101  140); 3:4 (i = 141  160); 3:9 (i = 161  180); 4:4 (i = 181  201);
(40)
where each agent holds the initial levels of capital stock in the last subsection. This
set-up has the following three characteristics. First, a majority of population (35 percent
of population) have a conventional parameter value  = 2:5. Second, we assume the
larger the initial levels of capital stock, the smaller the value of EIS (1=), which means
that the initially less wealth people like to save during the transition but the initially
relative-wealth riches dislike saving. Finally, the average value of risk aversion is given by
 = 2:95, meaning that the average value of  is larger than its majority. In other words,
we assume that a small portion of initially relative-wealth poor has greater degrees of
EIS and a large portion of initial riches has smaller degrees of EIS, to explain two tail of
low incomes and high incomes observed in realistic wealth inequality.
16Since the labor supply is inelastic in our model, the shape of dispersion of wealth is identical to that
of income.
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Making use of this setting, we numerically obtain the following steady-state values:
Skk = 0:35; S

k = 0:9584; S

 = 12:4307;  = 0:0303;
The wealth distribution eect (#2) in (17) = 0:0005:
In this economy, the steady-state level of wealth inequality is lower than the 52 percent of
initial level. Importantly, the distribution of wealth in Figure 5(c) is alike to the form of
realistic wealth inequality in the point that the lower tail of wealth follows a log-normal
distribution and the upper tail forms the Pareto law.
As for the dynamic motion of wealth inequality, Figure 5(a) shows that the level of
wealth inequality decreases until Time= 40, and after then, it mildly increases until the
steady state. In that regard, the dynamic movement of wealth inequality in this case is
similar with that in Case 3. Similarly, the dynamic motion of (#3), (#4) and (#5) in
Figure 3(b) and 5(b) are similar. Figure 5(d) gives the relationship between the levels
of long-run wealth and EIS, showing that the larger the degrees of EIS, the larger the
long-run levels of wealth. Because the risk lovers are riches in wealth, Figure 5(d) satises
the point [1] observed in Friend and Blume (1975) and Guiso and Paiella (2008).
To study the dynamic characterization of wealth inequality further, we turn our in-
terests into the dispersion of wealth given in Figure 5(e) and 5(f). Concretely, Figure
5(e) shows the dispersion of wealth at Time= 20 (the blue color) and Time= 50 (the red
color), and Figure 5(f) shows the relationship between wealth and EIS at Time= 20 (the
circle with the blue color) and Time= 50 (the sign + with the red color). Then, we can
nd how the uniformly distributed wealth at the initial economy forms a realistic wealth
inequality in the long run. Looking at the blue color in Figure 5(e) and 5(f), Figure 5(e)
shows that the blue bar graph has two peaks, and Figure 5(f) conrms who shape the
two peaks. The rst peak around 0.0255 consists of the agents i = 1   30 and some
agents whose degree of EIS 1=, is 0.4 (i.e.,  = 2:5). That is, when the initially less
wealth agents who have the greater degrees of EIS catch up with the majority in wealth,
this peak is shaped. On the other hand, we conrm that the other peak consists of a
part of agents i = 31   180, implying that when the initially relative-wealth riches who
have the lower degrees of EIS are caught by the majority, the other peak can be shaped.
When the time further passes from Time= 20 to 50, the wealth distribution given by red
color in Figure 5(e) is alike to the normal distribution, which means that two peaks at
Time= 20 disappear, and only one peak can be seen. Then, it can be found from Figure
5(f) that the initial poor with the greater degrees of EIS do not belong to this peak but
they are in the upper tail of wealth, and that the peak is composed of a part of majority
with  = 2:5 and the initial riches. Looking back to Figure 5(c) and (d) again, it can be
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seen that a part of initially relative-wealth riches with the lowest degree of EIS  = 4:4
forms the lower tail of wealth, and that the initial poor people own a lot of wealth further,
which shapes the upper tail of wealth.
Figure 5(g) observes the dynamic movement of personal wealth held by the 1st (top
25th percentile), 2nd (median) and 3rd quantile (bottom 25th percentile) of agents.
Firstly, because the average level of i;k is zero, from (20) we nd that the average
level of wealth is given by the straight dotted line. At the initial economy, the median
agent holds the average level of wealth. Secondly, looking at the dot-dash curve in Fig-
ure 5(g), the level of wealth held by the median agent increases until about Time= 35,
and hereafter, it decreases until the steady state, showing that the dynamic movement
of wealth held by the median agent is U-shaped along time. In addition, we can see
that the level of wealth held by the median agent is lower than the average level since
Time= 45, meaning that more than half of agents own less wealth than the average level
in the long run. These characterizations of wealth held by the median agent satisfy [2]
and [3] observed in the U.S. economy. Thirdly, the level of wealth held by 3rd quantile of
agent, which is given by the solid curve, increases until around Time= 45, and hereafter,
it decreases until the steady state. This movement is qualitatively alike to that by the
median agent. Alternatively, the level of wealth held by 1rd quantile of agent moves in
the opposite way.
Finally, we can conclude that the heterogeneities of EIS play the important role for
forming the wealth inequality in the sense that the characteristics of wealth inequality
in realistic economies are observed in our numerical simulation. Concretely, Figure 5(c)
gives a similar dispersion of wealth in realistic economy, Figure 5(d) imitates the empirical
nding [1] and Figure 5(g) imitates the empirical ndings [2] and [3]. Because of the
heterogeneities of EIS, we can obtain the qualitative characterization of wealth inequality
observed in realistic economies, while we cannot imitate the quantitative characteristics
of wealth inequality. For instance, dividing by ve wealth groups all agents, our case
shows that the Gini coecient in ve quantile groups is 0.0078 in the long run, and it is
very low compared with those observed in realistic economies. Furthermore, as for [3],
Wol (1998) nds that mean wealth is higher than four times of median wealth in U.S.
economy, while our simulation does not give such a large dierence.
When the qualitative characteristics are still satised, the key element of imitating
the quantitative characteristics such as increasing the Gini coecient may be to increase
the number of agents in the economy. For instance, let us change the number of agents
from 201 to 401 where the initial levels of capital holdings and the heterogeneities of EIS
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are given by:17
i = 1:8 (i = 1  6); 1:87 (i = 7  20); 2 (i = 21  60); 2:5 (i = 61  200);
i = 3 (i = 201  280); 3:4 (i = 281  320); 3:9 (i = 321  360); 4:4 (i = 361  401);
(41)
K01
K0201
= 0:9;
K02
K0201
= 0:9005; :::;
K0200
K0201
= 0:9995;
K0202
K0201
= 1:0005;
K0203
K0201
= 1:001; :::;
K0401
K0201
= 1:1;
In particular, noting that each proportion of agents for each degree of EIS in (41) is
the same with (40) in the previous case, we conrmed that the dynamic motion and the
steady-state characterization of wealth inequality do not qualitatively change; however,
the Gini coecient increases from 0.0079 to 0.0097. Similarly, increasing the number
of agents from 401 to 2001 yields the high Gini coecient further, 0.0112, with keeping
the qualitative characteristics of wealth distribution. Then, we may predict that the
extremely large number of agents leads to the Gini coecient observed in real economy
where the qualitative characteristics are still kept.18
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the heterogeneities of EIS into the Ramsey version of macro-
dynamic model with a nite number of agents. We obtain two main contributions. First,
we analytically characterize the steady-state levels of individual capital, and hence, show
the existence of unique steady-state equilibrium given the initial holdings of capital stocks
and the dierent degrees of EIS.
Second, we examine wealth inequality comprehensively. In particular, we conrm that
the dynamic motion of wealth inequality under the heterogeneous EIS is characterized by
the initially dispersed wealth, the long-run dispersion of EIS and the correlation between
EIS and wealth, while the simplication of homogeneous EIS yields only the impact of
initially dispersed wealth on wealth inequality. Finally, to obtain further insights into
the relationship between EIS and wealth inequality, we conduct the numerical simulation.
17When the number of agents further increases, it takes an extreme long time to simulate the dynamic
behavior; therefore, we pay attention to the case in which the number of agents is small compared with
that in realistic economies.
18The changes in the rate of time preference  and the productivity A may be useful in the mean
that these changes have the quantitative impacts on the wealth inequality, not the qualitative ones. For
instance, an increase in the rate of time preference from  = 0:04 to 0:12 yields Skk = 2:0694 in Case 1,
0.3028 in Case 2, 0.3020 in Case 3 and 0.5467 in Case 4; a decrease in the productivity from A = 0:5 to
0:25 yields Skk = 2:1135 in Case 1, 0.3138 in Case 2, 0.3378 in Case 3 and 0.6144 in Case 4.
25
Then, we conrm that the heterogeneities of EIS can be the important elements of shaping
realistic distribution of wealth.
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Table 1: Homogeneous EIS  = 2:5
K Skk 
Benchmark economy: 5.1905 0.6143 0.0325
Table 2: Heterogeneous EIS, wealth inequality and convergence speed
" poor rich K
 Skk S

k S

  (#2) in (17)
Case 1: 2.5 1.5 5.1905 2.2057 5.4552 15.1658 0.0394 0.0028
Case 2: 2 2.5 5.1905 0.328 -0.2094 2.3613 0.0353 -0.0012
Case 3: 1.5 2.5 5.1905 0.4183 1.1964 13.1106 0.0396 -0.0004
Case 4: 1.2 2.5 5.1905 0.7757 3.4641 26.2927 0.0437 0.0017
Table 3: The catching-up time in Case 3 and 4
The catching-up time T in (24)
poor rich i = 111 i = 121 i = 131 i = 141 i = 151 i = 161 i = 171 i = 181 i = 191 i = 201
Case 3: i = 91 1.5 2.5 4.5684 7.165 10.0302 13.2297 16.8567 21.0498 26.0282 32.1693 40.2114 51.9405
i = 101 1.5 2.5 2.1817 4.5456 7.1276 9.9749 13.1519 16.7501 20.9044 25.828 31.8852 39.7826
Case 4: i = 91 1.2 2.5 2.9233 4.5177 6.217 8.0373 9.9984 12.1254 14.4509 17.0178 19.8851 23.136
i = 101 1.2 2.5 1.4153 2.9113 4.4984 6.1896 8.0005 9.9507 12.0649 14.3749 16.923 19.7667
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